The pervasiveness of location-aware devices has spawned extensive research in trajectory data mining, resulting in many important real-life applications.
Introduction
Recently, the prevalence of various location-aware devices, such as RFID tags, cell phones, GPS navigation systems, and point of sale terminals, has made trajectory data ubiquitous in various domains. The fact has stimulated extensive trajectory data mining research [11] [14] [15] , resulting in many important real-life applications, such as city traffic management [20] , homeland security [19] , and location-based advertising [35] .
Having access to high-quality trajectory data is the prerequisite for effective data mining. However, trajectory data often contain detailed information about individuals, and disclosing such information may reveal their lifestyles, preferences, and sensitive personal information. Moreover, for many applications, trajectory data need to be published with other attributes, including sensitive ones, thus incurring the privacy concern of inferring individuals' sensitive information via trajectory data. This emerging data publishing scenario, however, has not been well studied in existing works. Such privacy concerns often limit trajectory data holders' enthusiasm in providing data for further research and applications. Example 1.1 illustrates the potential privacy threats due to trajectory data publishing. Example 1.1. A hospital has employed a RFID patient tagging system in which patients' trajectory data, personal data, and medical data are stored in a central database [27] . The hospital intends to release such data (Table 1) to data miners for research purposes. A trajectory is a sequence of spatiotemporal doublets in the form of (loc i t i ). For example, Record#3 indicates that the tagged patient visited locations b, c, and e at timestamps 3, 7, and 8, respectively, and has hepatitis (other information is omitted for the purpose of illustration). With adequate background knowledge, an adversary can perform two kinds of privacy attacks on the trajectory database.
Identity linkage attack : If a trajectory in the database is so specific that not many patients can match it, there is a chance that with the help of background knowledge an adversary could uniquely identify the victim's record and, therefore, his sensitive information. Suppose an adversary knows that the record of the target victim, Claude, is in Table 1 , and that Claude visited locations d and e at timestamps 2 and 4, respectively. The adversary can associate Record#1 with Claude and in turn identify Claude as an HIV patient because Record#1 is the only record containing both d2 and e4.
Attribute linkage attack : If a sensitive value occurs frequently with some sequences of doublets, it is possible to infer the sensitive value from these sequences even though the record of the victim cannot be uniquely identified.
Suppose the adversary knows that another victim, Bill, visited a1 and f 6.
The adversary can infer that Bill has HIV with 2/3 = 67% confidence because two of the three records (Records#1, 5, 8) containing a1 and f 6 have the sensitive value HIV. A trajectory database (e.g., Table 1 ) may contain other attributes, such as gender, age, and nationality. Although they are not explicit identifiers, an adversary may utilize combinations of these attributes, called quasi-identifiers (QIDs), to identify the records and sensitive information of target victims.
To thwart privacy threats due to QIDs, many privacy models, such as kanonymity [30] , ℓ-diversity [22] , and confidence bounding [34] , have been proposed in the context of relational data. These privacy models are effective for relational data anonymization; however, they fail to address the new challenges of trajectory data anonymization, as described below.
High dimensionality: Trajectory data are usually high-dimensional and cannot be effectively handled by traditional k-anonymity and its extensions due to the curse of high dimensionality [2] . Consider a transit system with 300 stations operating 24 hours a day. The corresponding trajectory database would have 300 × 24 = 7200 dimensions, because a trajectory could be represented in a tabular format with 7200 attributes filled with 0/1 values. Since k-anonymity and its extensions require every trajectory to be shared by at least k records and/or impose the diversity of sensitive values in every tra-jectory group, most data have to be suppressed in order to meet these kinds of restrictive privacy requirements.
Sparseness: Trajectory data are usually sparse. Consider passengers in transit systems. Among all available locations, they may visit only a few, making the trajectory of each individual relatively short. Anonymizing such short trajectories in a high-dimensional space poses great challenges for traditional anonymization techniques because the trajectories may have little overlap. Enforcing k-anonymity could lower the data utility significantly.
Sequentiality: Time contains important information for trajectory data mining, but it also brings new privacy threats. Consider two trajectories b3 → e6 and e3 → b6. They have the same locations and timestamps but in a different order and, thus, are different from each other. An adversary could exploit such difference in order to increase the chance of a successful linkage attack. Therefore, traditional k-anonymity is not applicable to trajectory data, and anonymizing trajectory data requires additional efforts.
Trade-off between Privacy and Utility
One common assumption of k-anonymity and its extensions is that an adversary may use any or even all attributes in QIDs to perform linkage
attacks. Yet this common assumption may be overly restrictive in the context of trajectory data. In a real-life attack, it is very unlikely that an adversary can identify all the visited locations along with the timestamps of a victim because it requires significant efforts to collect every piece of such background information. If the adversary is able to learn all such information, it is also possible that he can learn the victim's sensitive information. Thus, in the context of trajectory data, it is reasonable to derive a practical privacy model 
based on the assumption that an adversary's background knowledge on a target victim is bounded by at most L location-time doublets. We call such bounded background knowledge L-knowledge.
Based on this observation, we adopt a new privacy model called (K, C) Lprivacy that requires any subsequence q of any adversary's L-knowledge to be shared by either 0 or at least K records in a trajectory database T and the confidence of inferring any sensitive value in S from q to be at most C, where L and K are positive integer thresholds, C is a real number threshold in the range of [0, 1], and S is a set of sensitive values specified by the data holder. (K, C) L -privacy guarantees that the probability of succeeding in an identity linkage attack is ≤ 1/K and the probability of succeeding in an attribute linkage attack is ≤ C. Table 2 presents an example of an anonymous database satisfying (2, 50%) 2 -privacy from Table 1 , in which every sequence q with maximum length 2 is shared by at least 2 records and the confidence of inferring any sensitive value in S = {HIV, Hepatitis} from q is ≤ 50%.
Protecting privacy is one aspect of anonymizing trajectory data. Another aspect is preserving data utility in the anonymous data for data mining. The anonymized data may be used for different data mining tasks; therefore, we propose a generic framework to accommodate different utility requirements.
As an illustration, in this paper we aim to preserve both instances of locationtime doublets and frequent sequences in a trajectory database. The ratio of suppressed instances is a general measure of anonymized data quality for a wide range of trajectory data mining tasks [14] [15]; the ratio of suppressed frequent sequences is a direct indication of anonymized data quality for trajectory pattern mining [11] .
Generalization, bucketization, and suppression are the most widely used anonymization mechanisms. Generalization requires the use of taxonomy trees, which are highly specific to a particular application [3] . In many trajectory data applications, such domain specific taxonomy trees are not available. This fact largely hinders generalization's applicability on trajectory data anonymization. Bucketization merely breaks the correlation between trajectory data and sensitive attributes, and publishes trajectory data without any modification, which fails to protect identity linkage attacks on trajectory data. In addition, a condensation approach [3] is proposed for multi-dimensional data publishing. However, it does not prevent from attribute linkage attacks in general. Specifically, for trajectory data, its complexity grows exponentially due to the high dimensionality. Furthermore, there lacks a way of measuring the similarity of trajectories, which is essential to the condensation approach. Therefore, in this paper, we employ suppression, both local and global suppressions, to eliminate privacy threats from a trajectory database. The introduction of local suppression results in significant data utility improvements for trajectory data anonymization. In global suppression, if a location-time doublet p is selected to be suppressed from a trajectory database T , then all instances of p are removed from T , whereas in local suppression, some instances of p may remain intact in T while other instances are removed. Global suppression punishes all records containing p even if the privacy leakage is caused by only one instance of p in one record. In contrast, local suppression eliminates the exact instances that cause privacy breaches without penalizing others. Thus, local suppression preserves much better data utility compared to global suppression.
Contributions
In this paper, we acknowledge the emerging data publishing scenario, in which trajectory data need to be published with sensitive attributes. This naturally requires to prevent from both identity linkage attacks and attribute linkage attacks, which has not been studied in existing works. Based on the practical assumption that an adversary has only limited background knowledge on a target victim, we adopt (K, C) L -privacy model for trajectory data anonymization, which takes into consideration not only identity linkage attacks on trajectory data, but also attribute linkage attacks via trajectory data. We present an anonymization framework that supports both local suppression and global suppression with the goal of preserving data utility for data mining. This is the first study introducing local suppression to trajectory data anonymization. In this paper, we tailor our anonymization framework to preserve both instances of location-time doublets and frequent sequences in trajectory data. The framework itself is open to different data mining workloads by incorporating different data utility metrics. We provide comprehensive experimental evaluations on both synthetic and real-life tra-jectory data sets. The experimental results demonstrate that our proposed algorithm is both effective and efficient to address the special challenges in trajectory data anonymization. In particular, local suppression is shown to be essential to enhance the resulting data utility when combined with (K, C) L -privacy. from the data and then use them in the anonymization process. Kisilevich et al. [13] make use of the decision tree built on an original data set to perform multi-dimensional suppression for achieving k-anonymity. Matatov et al. [23] partition a data set into several k-anonymous projections, train a classifier on each of them, and then conduct classification tasks by combining the classifications of all such classifiers. Traditional privacy models for relational data suffer from the curse of high dimensionality [2] and, therefore, may render high-dimensional data totally useless for further data mining tasks. Recently, Mohammed et al. [26] propose the LKC-privacy model for high-dimensional relational data, which assumes that the adversary's prior knowledge is limited to at most L attributes in QID. They achieve the LKC-privacy model based on global generalization. In contrast, this paper focuses on trajectory data anonymization by local suppression.
Related Work
Dwork [5] proposes an insightful privacy notion based on the principle that the risk to a record owner's privacy should not substantially increase as a result of participating in a statistical database. Consequently, Dwork [5] introduces a privacy model called ϵ-differential privacy to ensure that the removal or addition of a single record does not have a significant effect on the outcome of any analysis. Differential privacy does not prevent identity and attribute linkages studied in this paper, but assures record owners that nothing can be discovered by comparing the databases with and without their records. Most works on differential privacy focus on relational data and are still limited to a very few primitive data mining tasks. Machanava et al. [21] further indicate that differential privacy can only be achieved by randomized mechanisms, for example, adding noise. Therefore, it cannot preserve data truthfulness, which is important if the data will be examined by human users for the purposes of auditing, data interpretation, or visual data mining.
Anonymizing Transaction Data
Recently, there is more focus on anonymizing high-dimensional transaction data [10] [12] [32] [38] [39] , in which sequentiality is not a concern. Ghinita et al. [10] propose a permutation method that groups transactions with close proximity and then associates each group to a set of diversified sensitive values. Terrovitis et al. [32] propose an algorithm to k-anonymize transac-tions by generalization according to some given taxonomy trees. He and Naughton [12] extend [32] by introducing local generalization, which gains better utility. Neither [12] nor [32] addresses attribute linkage attacks. In real-life trajectory databases, however, taxonomy trees may not be available or a logical one for locations may not exist. Moreover, Fung et al. [8] point out that if the taxonomy tree tends to be flat and fans out, which is the case of trajectory data, employing generalization loses more information than employing suppression because generalization has to merge all siblings of a selected node to their parent node, whereas suppression only removes the selected child node. Xu et al. [38] [39] extend the k-anonymity model by assuming that an adversary knows at most a certain number of transaction items of a target victim, which is similar to our assumption of limited background knowledge of an adversary. Though their method addresses the high dimensionality concern, it does not consider the sequential property of trajectory data and, therefore, is not applicable to trajectory data anonymization.
Furthermore, Xu et al. [38] [39] achieve their privacy model by global suppression, which significantly hinders data utility on trajectory data.
Anonymizing Trajectory Data
Some recent works Due to the high dimensionality of trajectory data, [29] and [31] study the anonymization problem on a simplified form of trajectory data, in which only temporal sequentiality is considered, known as sequential data. Pensa et al. [29] propose a variant of k-anonymity model for sequential data, with the goal of preserving frequent sequential patterns. Similar to the space translation method in [1] , Pensa et al. [29] transform a sequence into another form by inserting, deleting, or substituting some items. Terrovitis et al. [31] further assume that different adversaries may possess different background knowledge and that the data holder has to be aware of all such adversarial knowledge. The objective is to prevent adversaries from gaining further information from the published sequential data. The assumption of knowing all adversarial knowledge before publishing the data is possible in the specific scenario described in their paper, but it is not applicable in the context of trajectory data in general. The simplification from trajectory data to sequential data does help overcome the high dimensionality of trajectory data. However, for many trajectory data mining tasks, the time information is indispensable. Therefore, these approaches fail to satisfy the information requirements of the data mining tasks. Yarovoy et al. [40] present a novel notion of k-anonymity in the context of moving object databases (MOD) based on the assumption that different moving objects may have different QIDs.
Specifically, they consider timestamps as the QIDs, with moving objects' locations forming their values. Adversaries are assumed to conduct privacy attacks based on an attack graph. An underlying assumption of [40] is that the data holder must be aware of the QIDs of all moving objects. However, the paper leaves the problem of the acquisition of QIDs for a data holder unsolved.
All hance the resulting data utility, local suppression is utilized for the first time in the context of trajectory data. In addition, all these works are effective in some specific scenarios, while our proposed framework has fewer constraints, and therefore, is applicable for different trajectory data sources and different data mining workloads. 
Problem Definition

Trajectory Database
Privacy Threats
Suppose a data holder wants to publish a trajectory database T to some recipients for data mining. Explicit identifiers, e.g., name, SSN, and ID, have been removed. One recipient, the adversary, seeks to identify the record or sensitive values of some target victim V in T . As explained in Section 1, we assume that the adversary knows at most L spatio-temporal doublets that the victim V has previously visited. Such background knowledge about
Using the background knowledge κ V , the adversary could identify a group of records in T , denoted by T (κ V ), that "matches" κ V . A record matches κ V if κ V is a subsequence of the trajectory in the record. For example, in Table 1 , 2. Attribute linkage attack : Given T (κ V ), the adversary may infer that V has sensitive value s with confidence Conf (s|T (κ V )) =
denotes the set of records containing both κ V and s.
Conf (s|T (κ V )) is the percentage of the records in T (κ V ) containing s.
The privacy of V is at risk if Conf (s|T (κ V )) is high. Example 1.1 illustrates these two types of attacks.
Privacy Requirement
An adversary's background knowledge κ could be any non-empty subsequence q with |q| ≤ L of any trajectory in the trajectory database T .
Intuitively, (K, C) L -privacy requires that every subsequence q with |q| ≤ L in T is shared by at least a certain number of records, and that the confidence of inferring any sensitive value via q cannot be too high. attacks in trajectory data publishing because more and more trajectory data mining tasks will resort to both trajectory data and other personal information. For example, Utsunomiya et al. [33] conducted an interesting passenger classification analysis using both passengers' trajectory data and personal information. A recent investigation [28] further indicates that there is a need to enrich trajectory data by incorporating sociodemographic data for data mining tasks.
Utility Requirement
Since we aim at presenting a framework that allows the adoption of various data utility metrics for different data mining tasks, we illustrate the preservation of two different kinds of utility metrics, both instances of location-time doublets and frequent sequences in a trajectory database.
The ratio of suppressed instances is a general measure of the usefulness of anonymized data for a wide range of trajectory data mining tasks [14] [15].
In addition, previous works [9] [18] suggest that anonymization algorithms can be tailored to better preserve utility if the utility requirement is known in advance. We also preserve frequent sequences specifically for trajectory pattern mining [11] . However, extracting all possible frequent sequences in a trajectory database is computationally expensive. It is even exacerbated when dealing with large data sets with long frequent sequences because all subsequences of a frequent sequence are also frequent. A more feasible solution is to preserve maximal frequent sequences (MFS ). We emphasize that although in this paper we aim at preserving instances and MFS, the (K, C) L -privacy model and the anonymization framework presented in Section 4 are independent of the underlying utility metric and are flexible enough to serve other utility requirements. The only change is to replace the greedy function guiding the anonymization process, which will be further explained in Section 4.2.
Problem Statement
To achieve (K, C) L -privacy for a given trajectory database T , our pro- 
The Anonymization Algorithm
The proposed anonymization algorithm consists of two phases. First, identify all violating sequences that breach a given (K, C) L -privacy requirement in a trajectory database. Second, perform a sequence of local and global suppressions to anonymize the trajectory database while maintaining as much data utility as possible.
Identifying Violating Sequences
An adversary may use any non-empty sequence with length not greater Example 4.1. Given L = 2, K = 2, C = 50%, and the sensitive value set S = {HIV, Hepatitis}. In Table 1 , the sequence q 1 = a1 → b3 is a violating sequence because |T (q 1 )| = 1 < K; the sequence q 2 = a1 → d2
is also a violating sequence because Conf (HIV |T (q 2 )) = 2/3 = 67% > C.
However, the sequence q 3 = b3 → c7 → e8 is not a violating sequence even though |T (q 3 )| = 1 < K and Conf (Hepatitis|T (q 3 )) = 100% > C because
To satisfy a given (K, C) L -privacy requirement on a trajectory database 
To overcome the bottleneck of violating sequence enumeration, our insight is that a few "minimal" violating sequences exist among the violating sequences, and it is sufficient to achieve (K, C) L -privacy by removing only the minimal violating sequences.
Definition 4.2 (Minimal violating sequence). A violating sequence q is a minimal violating sequence (MVS ) if every proper subsequence of q is not a violating sequence.
Example 4.2. Given L = 2, K = 2, C = 50%, and S = {HIV, Hepatitis}.
In Table 1 , the sequence q 1 = d2 → e4 is an MVS because |T (q 1 )| = 1 < K, and none of its proper subsequences, d2 and e4, is a violating sequence. In contrast, the sequence q 2 = a1 → d2 is a violating sequence, but not an MVS, because one of its proper subsequences, a1, is a violating sequence. Conf (s|T (q)) for every sequence q ∈ C i , and for every sensitive value s ∈ S.
If a sequence q is not violating, it is added to the non-violating sequence set U i for generating the next candidate set C i+1 (Line 7); otherwise, q is added to the MVS set (Line 9). The next candidate set C i+1 is generated in two steps. First, conduct a self-join of U i (Line 11). Second, remove all super sequences of the identified MVS from C i+1 (Lines 12-14) . The second Add q to U i ; 8:
Procedure 1 Identify Minimal Violating Sequences (MVS)
Add q to V i ; 10:
i + +; 11:
Generate candidate set
for each sequence q ∈ C i do 13:
if q is a super sequence of any v ∈ V i−1 then 14:
Remove q from C i ; 15:
step significantly reduces the minimal violating sequence search space. Two sequences q x = (loc set S = {HIV, Hepatitis}, the MVS set generated from Table 1 is
Removing Violating Sequences
The second step is to remove all identified minimal violating sequences using suppression with the goal of preserving as much data utility as possible.
However, finding an optimal solution is NP-hard. Theorem 4.2. Given a trajectory database T and a (K, C) L -privacy requirement, it is NP-hard to find the optimal anonymization solution.
Proof. The problem of finding the optimal anonymization solution can be converted into the vertex cover problem. The vertex cover problem is a well-known problem in which, given an undirected graph G = (V, E), it is NP-hard to find the smallest set of vertices S such that each edge has at least one endpoint in S. To reduce our problem into the vertex cover problem, we only consider the set of MVS of length 2. Then, the set of candidate doublets represents the set of vertices V and the set of MVS is analogous to the set of edges E. Hence, the optimal vertex cover, S, means finding the smallest set of candidate doublets that must be suppressed to obtain the optimal anonymous data set T ′ . Given that it is NP-hard to determine S, it is also NP-hard to find the optimal set of candidate doublets for suppression.
Therefore, we propose a greedy algorithm that employs both local and global suppressions to eliminate all identified MVS, V (T ), with respect to the given (K, C) L -privacy requirement in order to efficiently identify a reasonably "good" solution. Generally, suppressing a doublet p from V (T ) increases privacy and decreases data utility. So our goal is to design a greedy function,
Score(p)
, that guides us to find the sub-optimal trade-off between privacy and data utility. In this paper, we define our greedy function as follow:
where P rivGain(p) is the number of MVS that can be eliminated by suppressing p, and U tilityLoss(p) is the number of either instances or MFS that are lost due to suppressing p, depending on the given utility metric. Since suppressing p may not cause utility loss in terms of MFS, we add 1 to the denominator to avoid the division by zero error. The function considers both privacy and utility simultaneously by selecting the anonymization operation with the maximum privacy gain per unit of utility loss. Considering only privacy gain or utility loss would lead to inferior performances according to our tests. Again, our anonymization algorithm is independent of the underlying data utility metric. To optimize the data utility for other data mining workloads, we can simply re-design the meaning of U tilityLoss(p). Proof. Suppose a doublet p is globally suppressed from a given trajectory database T . The database after the global suppression is denoted by T ′ .
A key to an efficient solution is to ensure that no new MVS will be gen
• For any sequence q in T not containing an instance of p, we have
any subsequence q ′ of q, which does not contain p either, we have
). So q cannot be a new minimal violating sequence in T ′ .
• For any sequence q in T that contains an instance of p, q no longer exists in T ′ , so q cannot be a new minimal violating sequence.
Therefore, no sequence in T will become a new MVS in T ′ .
However, local suppression does not share the same property. For example, locally suppressing c7 from Record#3 in Table 1 will generate a new
Identifying the values of all newly generated MVS requires expensive computational cost. Moreover, there is no guarantee that the anonymization algorithm can converge within a bounded number of iterations, |V (T )|. Therefore, it is beneficial to perform local suppressions only when no new MVS will be generated. Such a local suppression is called a valid local suppression.
Definition 4.3 (Valid local suppression). A local suppression over a trajectory database is valid if it does not generate any new MVS.
An intuitive way to check if a local suppression is valid is to re-invoke Procedure 1 and compare V (T ) and V (T ′ ). However, it is extremely costly.
Instead, Procedure 2 presents an efficient approach to avoid the computational cost of calculating the values of all newly generated MVS. It significantly narrows down the checking space to a very small set of sequences that may be affected by a local suppression by carefully using the properties of MVS.
Procedure 2 Check if a local suppression is valid
Input: Trajectory database T Input: Thresholds L, K, C, and sensitive values S Input: A doublet p in an MVS m Output: A boolean value indicating if locally suppressing p from m is valid and Conf (s|T ′ (q)) = Conf (s|T (q)). Identically, for any subsequence q ′ of q, Example 4.4. Consider Table 1 with L = 2, K = 2, C = 50%, and the sensitive value set S = {HIV, Hepatitis}. For the local suppression of d2 
Suppress the instances of p from T (m); 9:
Delete the MFS containing p if their supports are < K ′ after the suppression, otherwise update their supports; 10: else 11:
Suppress all instances of p in T ; 13:
Delete all MFS containing p from MFS-tree; Figure 1 presents the MFS-tree generated from Table 1 with
To find all the MFS containing f 6, simply follow Link f 6 , starting from the f 6 entry in the U L table.
Complexity Analysis
Our anonymization algorithm consists of two steps. In the first step, we identify all MVS. The most expensive operation is scanning the raw trajectory database T once for all sequences in each candidate set
where |C i | is the size of candidate set C i . The size of C 1 is the number of distinct doublets in T whose upper limit is |d|, the number of dimensions. Since C 2 is generated by self-joining all doublets in U 1 , whose size is less than or equal to |C 1 |, its upper bound is |d|(|d| − 1)/2. However, when i ≥ 3, the sizes of the candidate sets do not increase significantly for two reasons: 1) All candidates are generated by self-joining, which requires that only if two sequences share the same prefix, their resulting sequence can be considered a future candidate. When i is relatively large, the chance of finding two such sequences decreases significantly.
2) The pruning process in Procedure 1 also greatly reduces the candidate search space. Therefore, a good approximation is C ≈ |d| 2 . However, in the worst case, the com- 
Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we examine the performance of our anonymization framework in terms of utility loss due to the anonymization and scalability for handling large data sets. For preserving instances, the utility loss is defined 
, where N (T ) and N (T ′ ) are the numbers of instances of doublets in the original data set T and the anonymous data set T ′ respectively;
for preserving MFS, the utility loss is defined as on trajectory data anonymization because none of them can prevent from both identity and attribute linkage attacks. Instead, we compare our local suppression method with the global suppression method described in our technical report [25] . In the following experiments, we show that applying properties of the two experimental data sets are summarized in Table 3 .
Utility Loss
To fully study the effectiveness of our anonymization algorithm, we eval- Overall, KCL-Local performs significantly better than KCL-Global. In par- Utility Loss Effect of C. Figure 3 shows the impact of C on the utility loss while fixing L = 3, K = 30, and K ′ = 800, which allows us to examine the effect of attribute linkages. Since k-anonymity is unable to prevent attribute linkages, We also observe that local suppression is less sensitive to varying K ′ values due to the fact that local suppression allows decreasing the support of an MFS rather than always totally eliminating an MFS.
Scalability
Since the computational complexity of our algorithm is dominated by |d|, the number of dimensions, and |T |, the number of records, we study the scalability of our anonymization framework in terms of |d| and |T | on relatively large trajectory data sets generated with similar settings as City80K.
Since using local suppression results in better data utility, we only evaluate the scalability of applying local suppression for preserving MFS (using only global suppression requires less computing resources), where the following parameters are used: L = 3, K = 30, C = 60%, and K ′ = 800.
Effect of |T |. Figure 5 (a) presents the run time of processing data sets with 4000 dimensions and size ranging from 400,000 to 1,200,000. We can observe that the time spent on reading raw data sets and writing the anonymized data sets is proportional to the data set sizes. The time of identifying MVS sets also increases linearly, which confirms our analysis in Effect of |d|. In Figure 5 (b), we increase the dimensions on data sets of 1 million records. The time spent reading raw data and writing anonymized data is insensitive to the number of dimensions of the given data set. However, as the number of dimensions increases, it takes more time to generate the MVS set because the size of each candidate set increases. The size of the resulting MVS set also increases due to the increased sparseness. Thus, the time spent on suppressing all identified MVS also increases.
Overall, our anonymization framework is able to efficiently process large trajectory data sets. The total run time of anonymizing 1 million records with 8000 dimensions is still less than 300 seconds.
Conclusions
In this paper, we summarize the special challenges of trajectory data anonymization and show that traditional k-anonymity and its extensions are not effective in the context of trajectory data. Based on the practical assumption of L-knowledge, we achieve a (K, C) L -privacy model on trajectory data without paying extra utility and computation costs due to over-sanitization.
This is the first paper that introduces local suppression to trajectory data anonymization to enhance the resulting data utility. Consequently, we propose an anonymization framework that is able to remove all privacy threats from a trajectory database by both local and global suppressions. This framework is independent of the underlying data utility metrics and, therefore, is suitable for different trajectory data mining workloads. Our experimental results on both synthetic and real-life data sets demonstrate that combining (K, C) L -privacy and local suppression is able to significantly improve the anonymized data quality.
Though we adopt a stronger privacy notion than other existing works, in the context of trajectory data, by taking into consideration the possibility of inferring record owners' sensitive information via trajectory data, the specificity of trajectory data enables adversaries to perform other kinds of privacy attacks, especially when they are equipped with different types of background knowledge. These are interesting and open research problems, which are considered as our future research directions.
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